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Abstract
Climate change creates a crisis for economic development, which has historically been synonymous 
with high-carbon growth. It is essential for the world economy to make a rapid transition to a new, 
low-carbon style of growth. Developed countries might be expected to pay a large share of the total 
global costs of this transition, due to their ability to pay and their historical responsibility for causing 
the problem. 
Two-thirds of the world’s greenhouse gas emission reduction potential through 2030 is located in 
developing countries. More than half of that is in forestry, including reduction of emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (REDD), a top priority for near-term reductions. Beyond REDD, 
achieving the full potential of emission reduction in developing countries requires investment of 
hundreds of billions of dollars in energy, transport, and other sectors. One source of funding is the 
sale of offsets to developed countries – expanding the opportunities created by the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). The value of such opportunities depends on the scope of a future trading system, 
and on the initial distribution of carbon allowances.
Adaptation to the unavoidable damages from climate change is an additional financial burden on 
developing countries, with costs in the tens of billions of the United States dollars annually. 
Climate funding currently available under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol is less than $10 billion per year, most of it through CDM. 
Additional funding is provided by the World Bank and by bilateral aid programmes, but the annual 
total of all existing multilateral and bilateral climate funding is less than $15 billion. This is too 
small, by an order of magnitude, to meet the needs for climate investments in developing countries. 
Moreover, donor preferences have distorted some bilateral and multilateral aid efforts in the past; 
funding for climate investments could be weighted down by the reappearance of similar obstacles. 
Streamlined and improved institutional arrangements, such as a much-simplified replacement for 
CDM, will be needed. 
Finally, it may be worth studying an example of success in international environmental cooperation: 
the Montreal Protocol for reduction of ozone-depleting substances (ODS). The Montreal Protocol paid 
the costs of compliance for developing countries; it required majority agreement of both developed 
and developing countries for all decisions; and it set a threshold for per capita emissions, above 
which developing countries became subject to developed-country standards. Within this cooperative 
structure, the parties to the Montreal Protocol moved rapidly toward reduction of ODS, finding that 
costs were lower and benefits were higher than had been anticipated in advance. Could the same turn 
out to be true for the reduction of greenhouse gases? ix Financing the Climate Mitigation and Adaptation Measures in Developing Countries
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I.  The current understanding 
of climate change and the 
consequences for development
The scientific evidence is increasingly clear, and 
ominous in its implications: climate change, driven 
by fossil fuel combustion and deforestation, is a seri-
ous threat to lives and livelihoods in every part of the 
world. The 2007 summary from the Intergovernmen-
tal Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), representing 
the consensus of the world’s scientists, concluded 
that “Warming of the climate system is unequivocal 
... observational evidence from all continents and 
most oceans shows that many natural systems are 
being affected by regional climate changes” (IPCC, 
2007: 2).
Impacts will differ around the world, with high-
temperature and coastal areas generally hit harder and 
sooner. However, if the world economy continues on 
its present course, every country will be suffering 
from the effects of climate change long before the 
end of this century. IPCC projects regional impacts 
such as (IPCC, 2007: 11):
rapidly falling agricultural yields in some  • 
African countries, worsening food security and 
increasing malnutrition; 
decreased freshwater availability throughout  • 
much of Asia, along with increased flooding in 
major deltas and other coastal areas;
in Latin America, replacement of tropical forest  • 
with savanna in eastern Amazonia, together with 
decreasing productivity of some important crops 
and livestock, worsening food security. 
According to Nicholas Stern, the prominent 
British economist who led the Stern Review of the 
economics of climate change, “High-carbon growth 
– business as usual – will by mid-century have taken 
greenhouse gas concentrations to a point where a 
major climate disaster is very likely ... Put simply, 
high-carbon growth will choke off growth.” 
The climate crisis is also a crisis for develop-
ment. Historically, economic development has been 
synonymous with high-carbon growth; it has relied 
on massive use of fossil fuels, causing massive 
emissions of greenhouse gases. The most important 
greenhouse gas, carbon dioxide, remains in the 
atmosphere and contributes to global warming for 
a century or more after it is emitted. So the earth’s 
atmosphere is already filled, almost to its sustainable 
limit, primarily by the past emissions from today’s 
developed countries. 2 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 57
There is simply no more room for high-carbon 
growth by anyone. Even if developed countries re-
duce their emissions 90 per cent below 1990 levels 
by 2050 – the target advocated by the former United 
States Vice President Al Gore, which is more ambi-
tious than the leading United States and European 
proposals – the rest of the world will still need to 
begin rapid reduction in emissions by 2020 in order 
to avoid risks of dangerous climate change (Baer et 
al., 2008). Widely discussed targets for climate sta-
bilization, such as a 50 per cent reduction in global 
emissions by 2050, will require global per capita 
emissions to fall to less than half the level of China, 
Thailand, or Mexico today.1
The urgent need for development in low- and 
middle-income countries, therefore, can only be met 
by the creation and adoption of a new, low-carbon 
style of economic growth, along with the adoption 
of similarly low-carbon patterns of production and 
consumption in the developed countries. The shift 
to this new style of growth requires a process of 
global structural change in the course of which many 
synergies are possible between emission reduction 
and development objectives. Moreover, while this 
shift will cause losses and adjustment costs for many 
economic agents at the microeconomic level, it will 
also generate new income and gains for others. From 
this macroeconomic perspective, it has been sug-
gested that climate change mitigation may even have 
a growth stimulating effect in many countries, and 
that with appropriate environmental and industrial 
policies developing economies may share in the years 
and decades ahead in these gains (UNCTAD, 2009). 
Although the technological transformation of the 
world economy is the only viable option for the long 
run, it will require substantial additional investments 
in the short run. This paper examines the question of 
financing for those investments, with a focus on the 
problems of developing countries.
The question of the financing of investments 
for adaptation to and mitigation of climate change in 
developing countries is central to global negotiations 
on climate policy. Without a plan for climate financ-
ing that is mutually acceptable to everyone at the 
table, there will be no global agreement on emission 
reduction; with no new global agreement, there will 
be little chance of averting a disastrous deterioration 
in the earth’s climate.
As economists often point out, questions of ef-
ficiency can be separated from concerns about equity. 
Climate change is entirely global in its causes; every 
country is affected by the total quantity of greenhouse 
gases in the earth’s atmosphere. Therefore, the efficient 
solution, from everyone’s point of view, is to find the 
least-cost opportunities to reduce emissions (or to 
remove additional carbon from the atmosphere), regard-
less of location. Seen purely from the perspective of 
global cost minimization, some of the top priorities for 
climate protection may include slowing deforestation 
in Brazil, Indonesia, and other countries with extensive 
rainforests, and introducing energy conservation meas-
ures and alternative fuels in China, India, and other 
coal-dependent emerging economies. 
From an equity perspective, however, developed 
countries might be expected to pay a large share of 
total global costs, due to both their current ability 
to pay, and their historical responsibility for past 
emissions that still fill the atmosphere.2 That is to 
say, developing countries should not bear the sole 
responsibility for financing future emission reduc-
tions that occur within their borders. 
Proposals for international burden-sharing, such 
as Contraction and Convergence, the recent Green-
house Development Rights framework, and others, 
attempt to establish transparent, equitable allocations 
of responsibility. Contraction and Convergence al-
lows a transitional period, usually several decades, 
for the world to converge to a uniform, low per capita 
emissions level. Greenhouse Development Rights 
assigns shares of the total global cost of climate pro-
tection, in proportion to both historical emissions and 
current incomes above a minimum-income threshold. 
All such formulas assume that mechanisms exist 
or will be created to transfer financial resources to 
developing countries.
What channels should this financing flow 
through? Existing multilateral funds provide only 
limited resources, subject to many institutional and 
political constraints. What new institutions and 
international mechanisms are needed to finance the 
least-cost global reductions in emissions, when those 
reduction opportunities are located in countries with 
limited ability to pay for them?
The next section of this paper surveys the oppor-
tunities and costs for mitigation of carbon emissions, 
including the potential for sale of offsets, or carbon 
allowances, to developed countries. The related ques-
tion of adaptation to the effects of climate change, and 
its implications for funding needs, is addressed in the 3 Financing the Climate Mitigation and Adaptation Measures in Developing Countries
following section. The principal multilateral funding 
agencies for climate investments are the fifth sec-
tion, including the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM), the Global Environment Facility (GEF), 
and the World Bank’s Clean Investment Mechanism. 
Finally, the last section offers critiques of the existing 
institutions and suggestions for alternatives, includ-
ing a comparison to the more successful experience 
of the Montreal Protocol.
II.  Opportunities and costs for 
mitigation, and potential revenues 
from sale of offsets
How large are the opportunities for mitiga-
tion? The United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) produces periodic 
estimates, most recently in 2008, of the technical 
potential and the financing requirements for climate 
investments (UNFCCC, 2008). The latest report 
focuses on a relatively near-term target, namely 
reducing global emissions in 2030 by 25 per cent 
below 2000 levels, relying on estimates from the 
International Energy Agency and other sources.
The UNFCCC reference scenario – that is, the 
estimate of business-as-usual emissions, prior to 
reduction – includes a global total of 61.5 gigatons of 
CO2-equivalent (Gt CO2-e) in 2030, of which 35.6 Gt 
CO2-e are in non-Annex I countries. The global poten-
tial for reduction is 31.7 Gt CO2-e, of which two-thirds, 
or 21.7 Gt CO2-e, is located in non-Annex I countries. 
More than half of the non-Annex I reduction potential 
(indeed, more than one-third of the global total) is 
located in the forestry sector, including reduction of 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD), as shown in table 1.
An earlier UNFCCC analysis of the same emis-
sion reductions (described in the 2008 publication) 
estimated that the non-Annex I countries would need 
$176 billion of annual investment and financing to 
achieve these reductions (implying an average cost 
of just over $8 per ton of CO2-e), partially offset by 
$111 billion of annual savings on reduced fossil fuel 
supply and investment in fossil-fired power supply. 
Thus the net financing requirement was $65 billion 
per year. The current UNFCCC report (2008), how-
ever, suggests that the annual financial needs may be 
more than twice that large, due to revised estimates 
of the costs of low-carbon power generation.
In an even shorter time frame, bottom-up esti-
mates of mitigation potential in developing countries 
suggest a total of 7 Gt CO2-e by 2020, most of 
which is available at costs below $25 per ton of CO2 
(UNFCCC, 2008: 66–68). Of this amount, REDD 
accounts for 1.6 – 2.0 Gt CO2-e, with most reductions 
available for less than $15 per ton of CO2. The total 
technical potential for CDM-eligible technologies in 
developing countries is estimated at 4.8 Gt CO2-e, 
although non-price barriers and CDM rules about 
additionality imply that the market potential is lower 
than that. On the other hand, most of the underly-
ing cost studies assume oil prices in the range of 
$20–40 per barrel; as of mid-2009 the price hovered 
around $70 per barrel. Oil prices matter for projects 
which reduce the use of oil or other fossil fuels; the 
fuel savings is counted as a benefit, offsetting some 
of the cost of the investment. At a higher oil price 
the fuel savings is worth more, reducing the net cost 
of the project.
Both of the UNFCCC estimates of the poten-
tial for emission reduction in developing countries 
suggest the need for large amounts of financing. 
At $20 per ton of CO2, reductions of 7 Gt by 2020 
would require investment of $140 billion, while the 
larger estimate of 21.7 Gt by 2030 would imply over 
$400 billion per year.
Direct estimates of mitigation costs vary widely, 
based on multiple differences in scenarios and model 
assumptions. In a review of several recent estimates, 
the 2009 World Economic and Social Survey found 
a range from $200 billion to $1.2 trillion, or from 
0.2 to 2 per cent of world output (UN/DESA, 2009: 
154–155). 
Table 1
GREENhOUSE GAS EMISSION REDUcTION 
POTENTIAl, 2030 (GT cO2-e)
Sector Global Non-Annex I
Power generation 9.4 5.0
Forestry (includes REDD) 12.5 12.4
All other 9.8 4.3
Total 31.7 21.7
Source:  UNFCCC, 2008: 53.4 G-24 Discussion Paper Series, No. 57
Some categories of reductions, especially those 
involving REDD, may have costs lower than $20 per 
ton. Indeed, one of the principal conclusions emerg-
ing from the UNFCCC estimates is the importance of 
REDD. The search for low-cost global opportunities 
for mitigation repeatedly leads to a focus on tropi-
cal forest management. UNFCCC estimates, with 
considerable uncertainty in the underlying assump-
tions, that the 12.4 Gt CO2-e of forestry reductions 
in non-Annex I countries in 2030 might cost only 
$21 billion (UNFCCC, 2008: 53). Similarly, Ni-
cholas Stern’s “blueprint” for a new global deal on 
climate change involves spending $15 billion per 
year to combat deforestation in tropical countries; 
he estimates that this would buy 3 Gt per year of 
reduction at a bargain price of $5 per ton of CO2-e 
(Stern, 2009: 165–169).
Funding for forest management and protection 
will be of importance to those countries with substan-
tial forest areas. If adequate institutional structures 
and financing can be arranged, this initiative may 
lead to a rethinking of the role of forests and the op-
portunities for sustainable forest use, as one aspect 
of development. It is, however, only one specialized 
part of the development process even in well-forested 
countries, and it is of little direct importance for 
countries with more limited forest resources.
Emission reduction in other areas has broader 
implications for development; the central challenge 
is the creation of new, low-carbon ways of producing 
and using energy. Private-sector investment in clean 
energy in developing countries has grown rapidly, 
but reached only $26 billion in 2007; almost all of 
that investment occurred in China, India, and Bra-
zil. Total global investment in clean energy in 2007 
(most of it in developed countries) was $148 billion, 
which was 10 per cent of global energy invest-
ment, and 1 per cent of global fixed investments 
(UNFCCC, 2008: 61).
One of the easiest ways to obtain financing for 
climate investments may be the sale of offsets to 
developed countries. Some trading systems, such as 
the European Union’s (EU) current Emissions Trad-
ing System (ETS) and many other proposed systems, 
allow companies or nations to purchase offsets, 
representing emission reductions achieved in other 
countries. Roughly speaking, this can be seen as a 
continuation and expansion of the opportunity cre-
ated by the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) 
under the Kyoto Protocol. 
The size of the international carbon market 
depends on international, the United States, and 
European Union policy decisions; any projection 
of the market is based on guesses about those fu-
ture decisions. Estimates of the size of the market 
in 2020, from consulting firms specializing in this 
area, range from 0.5 to 1.7 Gt CO2-e, or from about 
the current size of the market to three times larger. 
In the highest estimate, purchases from the United 
States would account for half of the global market. 
At $20 per ton, these estimates imply that the offset 
market would provide financing of $10–34 billion 
in 2020, compared to roughly $8 billion in 2007 
(UNFCCC, 2008: 64–66). 
Looking farther into the future, most analyses 
have assumed that a comprehensive global trading 
regime will be needed to reduce the costs of climate 
stabilization. The size of a global carbon market 
could be enormous: a worldwide cap of 30 Gt CO2-e, 
trading at $20 per ton, would imply a total value of 
carbon allowances of $600 billion per year. Not all 
of that amount, of course, would flow to developing 
countries. 
The international flow of financing resulting 
from a future trading system depends entirely on the 
allocation of allowances. Some researchers have tried 
to estimate the distributional consequences of differ-
ent allocation schemes. Two major studies, described 
here, each model a path to climate stabilization under 
varying allowance allocations, and compare the rev-
enues received from the trading system to the costs of 
emission reduction for each region of the world.
Tobias Persson, Christian Azar, and Kristian 
Lindgren, at Chalmers University in Sweden, have 
estimated the net costs of climate stabilization for re-
gions of the world under three alternatives: equal per 
capita emission rights starting in 2020; contraction 
and convergence (i.e., the world moves gradually to 
equal per capita emission rights, while also reducing 
the global total) by 2050; and contraction and con-
vergence by 2100 (Persson et al., 2006). In general, 
equalization sooner is better for developing countries 
and worse for developed countries. 
Africa benefits from all three plans, with the 
annual gain exceeding current levels of official 
development assistance (ODA) to the continent. 
China experiences net costs from all three. South 
Asia benefits from equalization in 2020, breaks even 
from convergence by 2050, and has net costs from 5 Financing the Climate Mitigation and Adaptation Measures in Developing Countries
convergence by 2100. Latin America benefits from 
equalization in 2020, and roughly breaks even on the 
other alternatives; outcomes for Latin America are 
sensitive to the model’s assumptions about revenues 
from the sale of biofuels.
Michel den Elzen, Paul Lucas, and Detlef van 
Vuuren, at the National Institute for Public Health 
and the Environment (RIVM) in the Netherlands, 
have performed a similar analysis of regional abate-
ment costs under three different types of agreements: 
a multi-stage approach, gradually increasing the 
number of countries with binding emission targets; a 
proposal for reduction targets based on contributions 
to climate change and on per capita incomes; and 
contraction and convergence by 2050 or 2100 (den 
Elzen et al., 2005).3 Convergence by 2100 appears to be 
so slow that it undermines the pursuit of equity; under 
that approach, abatement costs are a smaller percentage 
of GDP, in both 2025 and 2050, for the United States 
and the EU than for most developing regions.
In general, den Elzen et al. (2005) find that the 
Middle East and the former Soviet Union face the 
highest costs, as a percentage of GDP, under all agree-
ments. Africa and South Asia have net benefits (i.e., 
revenues from the sale of offsets exceed total costs 
of abatement) under all plans except convergence 
by 2100. Latin America has costs as a percentage of 
GDP similar to those of developed countries, while 
costs for East and Southeast Asia are somewhat 
lower, but positive.
Thus both groups agree that with convergence to 
equal per capita rights by 2050 or sooner, the long-run 
costs of abatement with allowance trading provide 
net benefits to Africa and probably South Asia. East 
Asia faces some net costs, and implications for Latin 
America are uncertain.
III.  costs of adaptation, and funding needs
Even a rapid and successful programme of 
worldwide emission reduction can no longer prevent 
all climate damages. In addition to the costs of mitiga-
tion, the world must address the costs of adaptation 
to unavoidable climate impacts, such as additional 
drought, sea-level rise, shrinkage of the glaciers and 
snow-pack which supply water to many river basins, 
and increases in extreme weather events. 
Adaptation to climate damages is a very differ-
ent process from mitigation: in the broadest terms, 
adaptation involves protection and strengthening 
of current activities, in contrast to the invention of 
new technologies and development paths required 
for mitigation. For this reason, adaptation has more 
immediate synergy with development, as it often 
involves protection of public health, conservation 
of farmland, and improvements in disaster pre-
paredness (Michaelowa and Michaelowa, 2007). 
Economic development, if carefully managed, can 
increase resilience, promote adaptation, and reduce 
climate impacts (Garg et al., 2008). There are, how-
ever, sizeable costs associated with adaptation; just 
as with mitigation, financing for adaptation raises 
complex issues of fairness, including the distribu-
tion of impacts, and the ability to pay (Paavola and 
Adger, 2006). 
Estimates of global adaptation requirements 
are even more uncertain than those for mitigation. 
Adaptation is a complex, site-specific process, 
drawing on local knowledge and experience in deal-
ing with climate-related risks (Adger et al., 2003). 
However, adaptation cannot be entirely local, since it 
often involves national-scale political and economic 
changes designed to reduce poverty and vulnerability 
to climate damages (Eriksen and O’Brien, 2007). 
In the agricultural sector, which will be hard hit by 
climate change, adaptation is not only a matter of 
farm-level decisions, but increasingly depends on 
national governments, agri-business strategies, and 
trade policies (Burton and Lim, 2005).
Adaptation to climate change can include sev-
eral categories of actions (UNFCCC, 2008: 26):
measures that climate-proof economic activity  • 
by addressing future climate risk;
measures that improve the capacity to deal with  • 
future risks in general; and
measures that are exclusively intended to adapt  • 
to impacts of climate change.
Only the third category is completely concerned 
with adaptation to climate change; the important 
measures in the first two categories include many 
steps that address other development goals as well. 
For example, financial instruments for risk manage-
ment, such as insurance – which is currently rare 
in developing countries – are beneficial in many 
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multi-purpose nature of many adaptation measures 
makes it difficult to produce a definitive estimate of 
adaptation costs.
Bottom-up estimates of adaptation needs and 
costs are only beginning to be available. National 
adaptation programmes of action (NAPAs) completed 
by 38 least developed countries (LDCs) included 
about 400 “urgent and immediate” adaptation 
projects, with an average cost of about $2 million 
each (excluding a $700 million water management 
project to promote food security in Ethiopia). Many 
sectors and activities are included, with the great-
est number and the majority of costs in agriculture, 
livestock and fisheries; water resources; and coastal 
zones and marine ecosystems (UNFCCC, 2008: 
25). This is, however, a very partial estimate of total 
worldwide requirements.
Global estimates of annual adaptation costs 
from UNFCCC, World Bank, Oxfam International, 
and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) have all been similar in orders of magnitude, 
i.e. tens of billions of dollars, perhaps even over 
$100 billion – with a large fraction of the total in 
developing countries. UNFCCC estimates span the 
range from $49 billion–$171 billion, with one-third 
to just over half in developing countries (UN/DESA, 
2009: 157). UNDP’s Human Development Report 
for 2007–2008 projects a need for annual adaptation 
investment of $86 billion by 2015 (UNFCCC, 2008: 
23). Nicholas Stern has similarly estimated a need 
for $75 billion per year for adaptation funding (Stern, 
2009: 178). Private financing currently provides very 
little of the needed funding for adaptation. 
IV.	 Multilateral	financing	agencies	and	
mechanisms for climate investments
To summarize the story of the preceding sec-
tions, immediate action to combat climate change 
is an urgent global priority; the ongoing efforts to 
achieve economic development must occur in a 
climate-constrained environment, following a new, 
low-carbon technological path. Annual global fi-
nancing requirements are probably in the range of 
hundreds of billions of dollars for emission reduction 
and new energy technologies, and additional tens of 
billions of dollars for adaptation to the unavoidable 
damages from climate change. Many of the lowest-
cost opportunities for abatement, and many of the 
most costly damages requiring adaptation, will be 
located in developing countries. The climate crisis, 
however, is completely global in its origins and 
physical causes; it is largely the result of the past and 
present economic activity of high-income countries. 
Thus developed countries might be expected to pay a 
large share of the global costs of both mitigation and 
adaptation. There is a wide range of possible stand-
ards of fairness for allocation of the global burden 
of climate financing, which have been extensively 
discussed in recent analyses.4
International equity arguments provide the 
rationale for the existing multilateral financing for 
climate protection. Funding available under the UN-
FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol is the most important 
source of international financing for climate invest-
ments: the CDM, the Joint Implementation program 
(CCAP-JI), the climate change programmes of the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF), and the Adap-
tation Fund. Other sources of funding include the 
World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds and bilateral 
initiatives sponsored by Japan, Norway, Germany, 
and other countries.
By far the largest of these funding sources 
is CDM. Authorized by the Kyoto Protocol and 
launched in 2001, the Clean Development Mechanism 
grew slowly at first, but reached an annual volume 
of $8.4 billion by 2007. (The smaller JI programme 
added another $0.4 billion that year (UNFCCC, 2008: 
91).) Individual transactions under CDM are negoti-
ated between Annex I countries seeking reductions 
that can be counted toward Kyoto targets, and host 
countries offering to provide those reductions. The 
relatively small volume of transactions reflects, in 
part, the relatively lax Kyoto targets and the refusal 
of the United States to participate. It also reflects the 
notorious bureaucratic complexity of the CDM proc-
ess, with lengthy, case-specific analyses required for 
each transaction. It takes an average of 300 days for 
a project to complete the CDM regulatory process, 
with transaction costs as high as $500,000 per project 
(Stern, 2009: 160).
CDM is not only limited in total size; in practice, 
it has been narrowly focused on a few countries and 
activities. China alone has issued almost half (more 
than 46 per cent) of the certified emission reductions 
(CERs) under CDM; China, India, the Republic of 
Korea and Brazil together have issued more than 
90 per cent of the total.5 7 Financing the Climate Mitigation and Adaptation Measures in Developing Countries
Classified by type of project, more than half of 
the CERs issued to date have been for reduction of 
hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), a group of relatively 
rare industrial gases with high global warming po-
tentials.6 If a gas has an impact on global warming 
more than 10,000 times as great as carbon dioxide, as 
is the case for some HFCs, then reducing emissions 
by less than 100 grams of that gas is equivalent to 
reducing a ton of carbon dioxide. It is interesting to 
discover that industry in China and elsewhere was 
releasing HFCs, and that reducing these emissions is 
a cost-effective way to abate global warming. This 
is an unexpected insight into the complexity of the 
least-cost strategy for combating climate change; but 
like the focus on REDD, it provides no information 
about the methods for reducing carbon emissions 
from fossil fuel consumption, which is the heart of 
the problem in the long run.
International financing for climate investments 
is also provided, although in smaller amounts, by the 
GEF. This agency, created in 1991, is a partnership 
of many countries and international institutions, and 
provides grants in six areas of environmental concern, 
including climate change. It also acts as the designated 
financial mechanism for a number of multilateral 
environmental agreements, including the UNFCCC. 
GEF’s climate programme disburses about $250 
million per year for projects in energy efficiency, 
renewable energy, and sustainable transportation.7 It 
also manages two small, specialized funds for UN-
FCCC, the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) 
and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF).
Both LDCF and SCCF focus on aspects of 
adaptation. LDCF addresses the special needs of the 
48 least developed countries; SCCF has a broader 
mandate to address adaptation, technology transfer, 
and related areas. Both funds are dependent on volun-
tary contributions from national governments; to date, 
pledges from many European nations, Canada, Japan, 
Australia, and New Zealand have totalled $172 mil-
lion for LDCF, and $90 million for SCCF.8
Finally, the Kyoto Protocol also established 
the Adaptation Fund, a separately administered en-
tity that is funded by a two per cent levy on CDM 
transactions. At the 2007 rate of $8.4 billion in CDM 
funding, the Adaptation Fund would receive roughly 
$170 million per year. Proposals to boost adaptation 
funding by increasing the levy on CDM transactions, 
and by applying similar levies to other transactions, 
have been made, but not adopted.
Outside of the UNFCCC framework, the most 
important multilateral initiative is the World Bank’s 
Climate Investment Funds. Responding to the 2007 
Bali Action Plan, these funds were launched in 2008 
and received pledges of $6.1 billion from ten donor 
countries, primarily from the United States ($2 bil-
lion), the United Kingdom ($1.5 billion), and Japan 
($1.2 billion).9 Assuming that the funds will be 
disbursed over a four-year period, 2009 to 2012, the 
World Bank will be contributing $1.5 billion per year 
in grants and loans for climate investments. The funds 
are governed by boards giving equal voice to donors 
and recipients. There are two separate funds: the 
Clean Technology Fund, which includes programmes 
in electric power, transport, and energy efficiency; 
and the Strategic Climate Fund, which supports new 
development approaches that involve adaptation to 
specific climate challenges while complementing 
other development activities.
In addition to multilateral initiatives, there are 
a number of bilateral funding initiatives aimed at 
climate investments in developing countries. The 
largest is Japan’s “Cool Earth Partnership,” which 
is projected to spend $2 billion per year from 2008 
through 2012. Four-fifths of its funding is for mitiga-
tion, and one-fifth for adaptation.10 Other substantial 
initiatives include Norway’s pledge to spend up to 
$600 million per year on REDD,11 and Germany’s 
commitment of about €600 million to its International 
Climate Initiative (if spread over five years, 2008–
2012, the German initiative is roughly equivalent to 
$150 million per year).12 The European Union Global 
Climate Change Alliance, with total pledges of almost 
€300 million for programmes extending over several 
years, is supporting a combination of mitigation and 
adaptation measures in low-income countries; much 
of the funding is earmarked for disaster risk reduction 
efforts (UN/DESA, 2009: 94).
To summarize the current availability of funding 
for climate investments, there is less than $10 billion 
per year flowing through official UNFCCC-spon-
sored channels, almost all of it accounted for by 
CDM. Outside of the UNFCCC process, there is 
probably less than $5 billion per year in additional 
multilateral and bilateral climate funding, most of it 
in the World Bank’s Climate Investment Funds and 
Japan’s Cool Earth Partnership.13
These amounts are too small, by more than an 
order of magnitude, to meet the needs described in the 
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of funding for mitigation, the funds available for ad-
aptation are, if anything, even more inadequate to the 
task (Flåm and Skjaerseth, 2009). Funds for climate 
investments in developing countries are, moreover, 
provided through problematical institutional chan-
nels; it is not obvious that scaling up the existing 
institutions would be the right answer, even if the 
necessary funds were available. The next section 
examines some of the critical issues that have been 
raised regarding the existing financing channels.
v.  Alternative perspectives on climate 
financing	
This section addresses three topics regarding 
financing for climate investments in developing 
countries: 
the quantity of funding;  • 
the governance of funding mechanisms; and • 
the contrast with the more clearly successful  • 
experience under the Montreal Protocol for 
ozone-depleting substances.
A.  Funding and climate targets: not even close
On most policy initiatives, compromise and 
gradualism are the norm: half a loaf is always better 
than none; 10 per cent of what you want is better than 
5 per cent; there will be another chance to make your 
case next year.
In the case of climate policy, the latest findings 
from climate scientists (see the first section above) 
increasingly imply that there is no more time for 
gradualism and delay. How much we do in the next 
decade or two will determine whether or not future 
generations live in a tolerable, dependable climate. 
For a happy ending, the response today needs to be 
big, and fast.
The level of investment that is supported by the 
available funding sources is not even close to meet-
ing the targets for a livable future climate. Asking 
developing countries to make do with the existing 
multilateral and bilateral climate funds, a global total 
of less than $15 billion per year from all sources, is 
tantamount to ignoring the climate crisis.
A more appropriate scale of response is sug-
gested by Nicholas Stern, in his proposals for a new 
global agreement on climate change. He calls for a 
much-expanded global carbon market (which would 
mean a large increase in the revenues developing 
countries now obtain through CDM), and additional 
annual commitments from developed countries of 
$15 billion for programmes to reduce deforestation, 
$75 billion for adaptation, and $50 billion of public 
funding for research and development in clean energy 
technologies (an increase from $10 billion of clean 
energy research today) (Stern, 2009: 178). This, he 
calculates, would cost developed countries as a whole 
0.3 per cent of their GDP, in addition to the cost of 
meeting their own carbon reduction targets – an 
entirely affordable expenditure when the fate of the 
earth is at stake. Stern’s proposal, it should be noted, 
is toward the lower end of the range of estimates, 
discussed above, for the global costs of mitigation.
The 2009 World Economic and Social Survey 
argues that since financial and other markets are 
weaker in developing countries, the public sector 
has to assume a leading role in mobilizing and di-
recting resources. To finance climate investments in 
developing countries on the necessary scale, new 
measures and institutions will be needed. These 
might include:
a global clean energy fund, established out        side  • 
the existing multilateral financing organi-
zations;
a global feed-in tariff, guaranteeing fixed pur- • 
chase prices to producers of renewable energy 
in developing countries;
a reformed and streamlined CDM, which by  • 
some estimates could mobilize more than 
$40 billion annually;
separate forest-related financing mechanisms,  • 
to address the potential for both mitigation and 
adaptation in the forest sector; and
a global research, development, and deploy- • 
ment fund, along with measures to accelerate 
technology transfer.
B.  Who makes the decisions?
The majority of the limited funds available for 
climate investments come through UNFCCC-spon-
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programme, and the Adaptation Fund. Governance 
of these funds, while not completely problem-free, is 
at least part of the established international process 
for addressing the global climate crisis.
Funding provided through the World Bank and 
bilateral programmes, on the other hand, is outside 
of the United Nations-based international process. 
Critics such as Celine Tan have argued that the World 
Bank, along with the three principal donors to its cli-
mate funds (the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and Japan) are creating parallel frameworks of gov-
ernance that may undermine the existing multilateral 
process (Tan, 2008). New forms of conditionality, 
the bane of traditional foreign aid programmes, may 
appear as the World Bank elaborates its own criteria 
for climate funding. Echoes of the Bank’s traditional 
lending criteria, including tight fiscal discipline and 
structural reforms, may yet be heard in the climate 
arena. Meanwhile, the World Bank’s environmental 
record leaves much to be desired, and its energy 
programme, even in recent years, has remained 
heavily slanted toward fossil fuel production (Tan, 
2008: 11).
More broadly speaking, the reforms in de-
velopment financing in recent years, designed to 
reduce the intricate project-based requirements and 
donor conditionality restrictions of the past, may 
have ended up creating new, modernized forms 
of conditionality (Tan, 2005). Donor preferences, 
such as a favourable attitude toward privatization, 
continue to shape aid programmes. In the case of 
climate funding, the bureaucratic complexity of the 
CDM process, with its extremely detailed project-
specific requirements, may recreate some of the 
drawbacks of early, project-based aid efforts. The 
hoped-for expansion of carbon markets will require 
significant streamlining of the contracting process, 
if it is to achieve its goals of global efficiency and 
cost minimization. An enhanced, reformed CDM 
with lower transaction costs could, according to 
UNFCCC estimates, yield more than $40 billion per 
year by 2020 – five times the recent level of CDM, 
though still only a fraction of what is needed (UN/
DESA, 2009: 174).
Along these lines, it has been suggested that tar-
geted funding programmes will inevitably fall short 
of what is needed; in addition to such programmes, 
governments should focus on realigning incentives, 
for instance eliminating subsidies for fossil fuels and 
creating infrastructure, support, and incentives for 
renewables. Such measures will send a clear market 
signal, prompting an increase in private investment 
in clean energy (Miller, 2008). This is not a complete 
replacement for targeted, multilateral funding, but 
it may be a valuable complement to conventional 
financing initiatives.
Even the existing multilateral institutions may 
be in need of reform. An analysis of the GEF adap-
tation funds found that they are not adequate to the 
task of responding to developing countries’ needs, 
owing both to the complexity of the funds and to 
incomplete implementation of UNFCCC guidance. 
Improvements in both communications and organi-
zational structure are needed in order for multilateral 
adaptation funding to serve the needs of the affected 
countries (Möhner and Klein, 2007).
Concerns about the weakness and limitations 
of existing, single-purpose multilateral organizations 
has led some observers to advocate the creation of 
a more powerful, multi-issue World Environmental 
Organization – or a World Environment and Devel-
opment Organization. Such an organization could 
improve coordination among issues and organiza-
tions, promote capacity building and technology 
transfer, and initiate and manage new environmental 
treaties (Biermann, 2000; Biermann and Simonis, 
1998).
Provision for technology transfer in clean 
energy and related fields is essential in any new cli-
mate agreement. Most of the crucial climate-related 
technologies have been developed and patented in 
industrial countries. Strict protection of existing 
intellectual property rights could slow the deploy-
ment of new technologies in developing countries, 
undermining the pursuit of rapid, cost-effective 
emission reduction. The experience with clean en-
ergy technologies in emerging economies such as 
China, India, and Brazil has been mixed. Barriers to 
entry have been relatively low in the photovoltaics 
and biofuels industries, allowing new companies 
and countries to compete. In contrast, wind power 
and automobile pollution control technologies have 
been more tightly controlled by established producers 
based in developed countries (UN/DESA, 2009). In 
theory, free trade could accelerate the transfer of new 
technologies; in practice, some trade agreements, par-
ticularly bilateral ones between unequally matched 
countries, may incorporate restrictive language on 
intellectual property rights that will impede the flow 
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C.  Success is sometimes an option
Focusing only on the limitations of existing cli-
mate financing, both in magnitude and in governance, 
could lead to very gloomy conclusions. To end on a 
positive note, it is worth examining the lessons of a 
more successful episode, the process of compliance 
with the 1987 Montreal Protocol on ozone-depleting 
substances (ODS). How and why did the Multilateral 
Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol 
succeed in phasing out those substances around the 
world, in a relatively short period of time and with 
minimal conflict?
The Montreal Protocol is widely seen as a 
premier success story for international environmen-
tal agreements. It achieved near-universal global 
participation, and progressed promptly toward its 
goal of replacing ODSs with safer alternatives. It 
established different deadlines for industrial and de-
veloping countries, with a rapid phase-out of ODSs 
in developed countries and a much longer timetable 
for developing countries. In an insightful analysis, 
Frank Biermann and Udo Simonis identified several 
lessons to be drawn from the success of the Montreal 
Protocol, which are potentially relevant to agree-
ments on climate change and other issues (Biermann 
and Simonis, 1999):
Nearly all of developing countries’ incremen- • 
tal costs of compliance were paid, net of the 
identified economic savings that resulted from 
compliance.
The governance structure encouraged coopera- • 
tion; all decisions required simple majorities of 
both the developed and developing countries, 
and a two-thirds majority of the parties as a 
whole. This led to a high degree of trust, and 
decision-making by consensus was the norm.
Concerns about trade distortions were effec- • 
tively addressed; subsidiaries of multinational 
corporations, and developing-country enter-
prises producing predominantly for export into 
industrial countries, were not reimbursed for 
conversion costs.
Developing countries which exceeded a  •  thresh-
old of per capita consumption of harmful 
substances “graduated” into becoming respon-
sible for making financial contributions, and 
for meeting the industrial countries’ reduction 
schedule. Wealthier countries such as the United 
Arab Emirates thus faced the same standards as 
industrial countries.
In-kind contributions of ODS-reducing equip- • 
ment were accepted from some ex-Soviet 
countries, which were unable to meet their 
obligations in hard currency.
One advantage enjoyed by the Montreal Proto-
col, in contrast to the climate problem, was the much 
smaller magnitude of the necessary investments; the 
leading international agencies involved in aiding the 
ODS phase-out in developing countries spent a total 
of $1.2 billion through 2003 (Luken and Grof, 2006). 
However, as Catherine Norman, Stephen DeCanio, 
and Lin Fan observed in a retrospective analysis, 
Perhaps the most important lesson learned 
so far from experience in implementing the 
Montreal Protocol is that the technological 
and economic disruptions accompanying 
replacement of ODSs with ozone-friendly 
technologies have been much less serious 
than originally feared. Also, the Protocol has 
stimulated both R&D and institutional change 
that have improved product quality and profit-
ability in unanticipated ways (Norman et al., 
2008: 138).
The availability of new technologies, combined 
with an international agreement to assist developing 
countries in adoption of those technologies, had nu-
merous indirect benefits. A review of ODS-reducing 
projects implemented by the United Nations Indus-
trial Development Organization (UNIDO) found that 
they typically reduced greenhouse gas emissions 
and local pollutants as well as ODSs, maintained or 
increased employment, and frequently led to overall 
modernization of developing-country firms that had 
previously relied on outdated production practices 
(Luken and Grof, 2006).
In summary, the Montreal Protocol had near-
universal involvement, with equal roles in govern-
ance for developing and industrial countries; it had 
differentiated timetables for emission reduction; 
it addressed trade distortions; and it financed the 
introduction of new technologies in developing 
countries, which had multiple benefits in addition to 
the intended reduction in ODSs. 
Application of a similar approach to climate 
investment would face additional hurdles resulting 
from the much larger funding requirements, and 
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new technologies. Yet it may be helpful to imagine 
what a climate agreement in the spirit of the Montreal 
Protocol would look like: 
Developed countries would pay the incremental  • 
costs of compliance for developing countries, 
net of any economic benefits that accrue to the 
developing-country hosts;
Developing countries receive international assis- • 
tance in the adoption of new, clean tech  nologies;
Subsidiaries of multinational corporations, and  • 
enterprises producing primarily for export, 
would be excluded from these benefits;
When developing countries cross an established  • 
threshold level of per capita income, they are 
reclassified as developed countries for the pur-
poses of the agreement;
A new international governing body is estab- • 
lished, in which all major decisions must be 
endorsed by majorities of both the developed 
and the developing countries.
In the case of the Montreal Protocol, this insti-
tutional framework led to a high degree of trust and 
cooperation, and to rapid reduction in the costs of 
clean technologies, since all parties shared an interest 
in cost reductions.
Despite differences of scale and expense, the 
Montreal Protocol experience stands as a reminder 
that success is sometimes an option – and that much 
can be accomplished by skillful design of multilateral 
financing structures and environmental protection 
measures. Could the same turn out to be true for the 
reduction of greenhouse gases?
Notes
 1  Global emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuel com-
bustion amounted to 6.1 billion metric tons of carbon in 
1990, and 8.2 billion tons in 2006. A 50 per cent reduction 
thus allows a global total in 2050 of about 3 billion tons if 
measured from 1990, or 4 billion tons if measured from 
2006. With an estimated global population of 9 billion 
in 2050, this is less than 0.5 tons per capita. In 2006, per 
capita emissions in Mexico, Thailand, and China were 
1.1–1.3 tons. Data from Carbon Dioxide Information 
Analysis Center, United States Department of Energy 
(DOE), http://cdiac.ornl.gov. 
 2  Among other sources, this is argued persuasively in Baer 
et al. (2008).
 3  den Elzen’s second alternative, described as a modified 
version of the “Brazilian proposal” from past negotiations, 
is similar in spirit to the greenhouse development rights 
proposal of Baer et al. (2008).
 4  Baer et al. (2008) offers a flexible formula that can be 
adjusted to reflect varying standards and thresholds for 
financial responsibility
 5  CDM website, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Issuance/
CERsIssuedByHostPartyPieChart.html.
 6  UNEP Risø Centre, http://cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-
type.htm.
 7  Global Environment Facility website, http://www.gefweb.
org/. 
 8  Global Environment Facility website, http://www.gefweb.
org/.
 9  World Bank website, http://web.worldbank.org .
  10  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.
go.jp/policy/economy/wef/2008/mechanism.html .
  11  Government of Norway, http://www.norway.or.id/policy/
environment/introforest1.htm .
  12  German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature 
Conservation and Nuclear Safety, http://www.erneuerbare-
energien.de/inhalt/42000/ .
  13  Similarly, the 2009 World Economic and Social Survey 
estimates “current dedicated climate resources,” exclud-
ing CDM, at $21 billion, of which the multi-year totals 
for Japan’s Cool Earth Partnership and the World Bank’s 
Climate Investment Funds account for more than $16 bil-
lion. The remainder of their total includes several funds 
that have not yet received pledges for the full, targeted 
amounts (UN/DESA, 2009: 157–159). 
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